Abstract: Textbooks on financial management have emphasized the shortcomings of the payback criterion for decades. However, empirical evidence suggests that in actual capital budgeting procedures the payback method is used quite regularly. Mostly, it is implemented supplementary to net present value or internal rate of return, but small companies tend to rely on payback times as single criterion. A convincing theoretical foundation for the observed use of the payback criterion is lacking.
2 cation of the payback method is remarkable. As a matter of fact, no consensus exists which forces are driving this phenomenon. Some previous papers try to explain the payback method's popularity by interpreting it as a means of risk controlling or liquidity planning. Further, some authors argue that the payback method's simplicity in combination with management's lack of familiarity with more sophisticated methods of investment appraisal results in the persistence of this rule of thumb.
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However, a convincing theoretical foundation for the observed use of the payback criterion is still lacking. Accordingly, our goal is to provide an explanation for the payback criterion's popularity. A major contribution of our approach is to recognize the importance of fundamental organizational aspects, like delegation or hierarchical subordination, for investment decision processes.
11 This contrasts with previous theoretical contributions attempting to justify the application of the payback criterion, because they concentrate on a single decision maker. 12 Hence, these papers do not capture a key issue of modern capital budgeting procedures -the interaction of managers from different hierarchy levels and professional backgrounds. Due to the complexity of modern investment projects many real world capital budgeting decisions require expertise from various different areas like, e.g., technology, engineering, sales, finance, and sociology. Moreover, preparatory tasks, like data gathering, preparing proposals etc., are delegated within organizations. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that investment decisions are subject to several personal views and depend on the organizational context at hand. To secure consistency, in many companies these multi-person multi-level capital budgeting procedures are governed by a formal screening and review body, like an investment committee. Moreover, they are structured by formal guidelines, schedules, and manuals intended to secure a broad support for a successful investment project. 13 In such an environment the use of appraisal techniques acceptable for all relevant decision makers simplifies reaching mutually agreed upon decisions. However, note that we do not search for an automatism identifying the best investment decision for a given data set, i.e., we are not aiming at replacing the complete decision making process within the organization by a black box. Rather, we are looking for a decision theoretical justification of 3 the payback method as an instrument to ease decision making on risky investment projects, accepting its application as key investment figure in practice.
We will demonstrate that the payback criterion may be a mutually acceptable tool in the sense discussed above. By its implementation a multitude of personal risk preferences can be represented in the investment process simplifying the coordination of decision making. 14 For modeling this representation problem we use almost stochastic dominance (ASD) introduced by Leshno and Levy (2002) . Firstly, we show that this concept allows to include the risk preferences of the relevant decision makers into the analysis. Secondly, it can be shown that conveying these preferences to those who do the preparatory work preceding the final decision can be achieved by means of ASD as well. This finding provides a potential explanation for the payback's persisting prominence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 an overview of the empirical and theoretical literature focusing on the payback method is given. In section 3, we consider fundamental organizational features of the capital budgeting process in a stylized manner, i.e., we identify the impact of organizational aspects on the importance of the payback criterion. In section 4 the modeling device of almost stochastic dominance is introduced, the new investment appraisal criterion (Leshno-Levy criterion) is derived, and its relation to earlier research on payback times by, e.g., Gordon (1955) and Levy (1968) is clarified. The paper concludes with a brief summary in section 5.
Literature review
From an academic perspective net present value (NPV) has been argued to be the favorable capital appraisal technique over decades. Nevertheless, early studies dating from the '60s find the discounted cash-flow techniques -including NPV-to be the least popular ones. 15 Moreover, some of these studies identify the payback method (PB) as the most popular appraisal technique, irrespective of its well-documented shortcomings, like ignoring time value of money, ignoring cash flows beyond the cutoff date, and setting the cut-off period arbitrarily. Even today the payback 14 Similarly, Arnold (2005, p. 156) : "There is an indication in the literature that [...] simpler methods are used for purposes such as communicating project viability and gaining commitment throughout an organisation."
15 For an overview of these early studies cf. Ryan/Ryan (2002, p. 357 ).
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method is still used quite regularly as many empirical studies show. 16 These studies have isolated a number of factors with explanatory power for the prominence of the payback method. Besides capital budget size 17 and the degree of shareholder-value orientation 18 the most prominent factors are:
• firm size: Empirical observations indicate that small companies tend to rely more often on the payback method. 19 However, as Lefley (1996, p. 208 ) points out, the results are controversial.
20
• CEO/CFO age and tenure respectively CEO/CFO level of education: The younger a CEO/CFO and the higher his degree of education the more often sophisticated appraisal techniques, like NPV or internal rate of return (IRR), are used, meaning the relative importance of PB decreases.
21
• firms' capital constraints: Pike (1983, pp. 666 and 669) claims that the paybackcriterion is used more often, and profitability measures less often, the more restricted financial resources are. However, neither Brounen et al. (2004, p. 8) nor Graham/Harvey (2002, p. 12) can confirm this hypothesis.
• nationality: European companies are more hesitant to apply discounted cash flow techniques than American ones. 22 For Asian companies the payback method even dominates in terms of application frequency and importance.
23
Although nationality has an influence on payback method's application frequency its use is nevertheless a world-wide phenomenon, see the international overview provided in Horngren et al. (2006) , which is extended and up-dated in Table 1 .
24
Here the application frequencies of the most popular techniques are listed by country:
16 For an overview of such empirical studies from 1970 to 1995, cf. Lefley (1996, pp. 217) . 17 Cf. Ryan/Ryan (2002, pp. 359) . 18 Cf. Brounen et al. (2004, p. 8) .
19 Cf. Brounen et al. (2004, p. 8) , Graham/Harvey (2002, p. 12) , Ryan/Ryan (2002, p. 361) . 20 Cf. Arnold/Hatzopoulos (2000 , p. 605), Block (1997 , p. 289), Sangster (1993 as well. 21 Cf. Brounen et al. (2004, p. 8) , Graham/Harvey (2002, p. 12) . 22 Cf. Brounen et al. (2004, p. 5) . 23 Cf. Ann et al. (1987, pp. 116) . Hermes et al. (2005, p. 7) argue that a host country's stage of economic development should influence the companies' capital budgeting. However, regarding payback method they cannot confirm this claim given their sample of Dutch and Chinese firms.
24 Cf. Horngren et al. (2006, p. 735) . The column-wise accumulated percentages add up to more than 100%, meaning that companies regularly apply two or more methods simultaneously. 
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Despite differences in sample sizes, firm sizes and considered industries, Table 1 provides a general empirical insight. Obviously, profitability measures, like NPV and IRR, and the payback criterion are used side by side. However, according to Pike (1996, p. 83) only NPV and IRR are used as substitutes indicating that the payback method is not regarded as a simple rule of thumb replacing more sophisticated profitability measures. 34 Thus, the payback method's persistence cannot be explained satisfactorily by its simplicity in combination with lack of familiarity with more sophisticated methods. Further, if this argumentation were true, with the improvement of CEOs' and CFOs' education the gap between theory and practice should narrow, i.e., the use of the payback method should vanish. But, longitudinal UK data do not support this assumption. Table 2 shows that the prominence of the payback method has not been decreasing over time.
35
25 Cf. Graham/Harvey (1999, p. 27) . 26 Cf. DeBrounen et al. (2004, p. 7) . 27 Cf. also O'Brien (1997, pp. 180) for the widespread use of the payback criterion in Ireland. 28 Cf. Hall (2000, p. 361) . Note that the data refer to the most important method to be used. 29 Cf. Arnold/Hatzopoulos (2000, p. 605) . In brackets are given the data for the 100 largest companies included in the Times 1000.
30 Remember the abbreviations for Net-Present-Value (NPV), Internal Rate of Return (IRR), and payback time (PB).
31 Percentages refer to the use of both variants of the pay-back-method -static and discounted version.
32 The study by Brounen et al. (2004) reproducing the set-up used by Graham/Harvey (2001) is presented in Table 8 in appendix A.
33 Cf. Ann et al. (1987, pp. 116) . 34 In contrast, Arnold/Hatzopoulos (2000, p. 608) find that NPV and IRR gain at the expense of the payback method to a minor extent.
35 Similar overviews for the USA -given in appendix A as Table 9 -confirm the observation extracted from the UK data.
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Pike (1996) , data for Sangster Lefley Arnold/Hatzo-1975 1980 1986 1992 ) (1994 38 An example for the use as a constraint is given when a required payback period -subjectively determined based on past experiences and project risk estimations-is used in the sense of a hurdle-rate. An example for the use as a secondary criterion is given, when projects of the same profitability are ranked by their pay-off period. While PB as a secondary criterion allows for an additional finetuning in the projects' ranking, the application as a constraint sorts out projects independent of their profitability.
Early analytical papers try to justify the payback criterion as a proxy for profitability. Gordon (1955, pp. 253) shows that the reciprocal of the payback period can be interpreted as an estimation of the IRR. His analysis has been extended by Levy (1968 and 1971) and Sarnat/Levy (1969) . Mepham (1975, p. 869) Pike (1988, p. 347) . 37 The difference between use and importance is elaborated in Lefley (1996, p. 208) . He finds that use of PB is positively and importance of PB is inversely related to firms' capital budget size.
38 Pike (1983) finds that 90% of firms implementing multiple methods use PB. Similarly, Shields et al. (1991) suggest that U.S. companies maximize net present value or rates of return subject to payback constraints. method performs in identifying promising projects compared to more sophisticated techniques.
39
With rise of the agency paradigm, the application of the PB method has been explained by incentive effects due to institutional properties. For instance, Narayanan (1985) concludes that a manager benefits from applying the payback method to investment selection problems. By choosing projects with early cash-inflows he improves the expectation about his skills and hence the present value of his remuneration.
40 A similar principal-agent conflict is analyzed by Thakor (1990) . Here the payback method is used as a means of harmonizing the goals of actual shareholders and future investors.
Moreover, payback times are considered as a means of accounting for liquidity constraints. Weingartner (1969) states that the application of the PB method selects projects with high cash flows in the early periods of the useful life. In this sense the PB method minimizes the risk of foregoing other investment projects due to lack of capital, i.e., PB increases the probability of being able to invest in unforeseen future investment alternatives. This means, payback times account for the management's restricted forecasting ability. 41 Wambach (2000) analysis a situation, where the investment outlay instead of future cash-inflows is uncertain. Based on a real-option approach the payback period is used as an indicator for the optimal time instance for investment activities given required capital outlays decrease over time.
42
Our approach combines three dimensions of the literature reviewed above. Firstly, we concentrate on riskiness of investment projects, like Weingartner (1969) or Wambach (2000) . Secondly, we incorporate into our model important organizational features of typical capital budgeting processes, extending the view of agency theory.
Thirdly, we shall find that the central appraisal criterion deduced following our approach may be seen as a generalization of the contributions by Gordon (1955) and Levy (1968) . Interestingly, the evidence provided in Table 1 is consistent with our risk-controlling justification of the payback method: Interpret NPV and IRR as profitability measures and PB as a risk figure. Then, a simple explanation for the simultaneous use of NPV or IRR on the one hand and PB on the other hand is 39 Cf., e.g., Hertz (1968) . 40 Similar arguments can be found in Pike (1985, p. 50) and Chen/Clark (1994, p. 123) . For an overview of papers dealing with incentive effects caused by reputational concerns, see Hirshleifer (1993, pp. 148) .
41 Cf. Lefley (1996, p. 209 This scenario describes small family-owned companies or start-ups where, e.g., engineers develop and market a product from an invention without a strong background in business knowledge. Here, the use of the payback method might be explained by the knowledge hypothesis, i.e., the payback method is used because of its simplicity.
• The scenario 'representative's decision' is very similar to the entrepreneurial one. However, companies are slightly bigger, so that the generation of ideas for investment projects and the subsequent appraisal and selection process are (partly) delegated. Minimum requirements, e.g., profitability hurdle rates, are communicated via key figures serving as appraisal criteria. Due to the existence of a hierarchically superior decision maker the representative needs to justify his decision according to these key figures. This implies that a critical payback time may result from the entrepreneur's individual preferences or experiences. Hence, the payback method is a rule of thumb rather than a theoretically based criterion.
• The scenario 'board decision' indicates that top-level decision makers decide upon the investment projects to be funded. Because data gathering is delegated and pieces of information are aggregated in a proposal, an unbiased communication via key indicators is required. Further, the decision process needs co-ordination, because, e.g., power can be distributed asymmetrically among board members. Therefore, inter-subjectively reliable measures are needed to make a compromise or to find a majority on the board. In this case, PB might be used as a secondary criterion.
• An 'investment committee' bundles the investment competences for the whole firm relieving top level management. It is formed by members of various skills from different departments, like technicians, accountants, and engineers. They have to communicate subjective assessments and predictions in such a manner that they can be reproduced and understood by third parties. Further, due to uncertainty of cash flows an inter-subjective definition of acceptable risk has to be found. Here, the payback method typically serves as a constraint,
i.e., as a tool for communicating the decision maker's risk preferences to the applicant or the management accountant.
Identifying the need for a certain investment, the search for corresponding investment alternatives, and the preparation of the investment proposal typically belong to the competences of the operating divisions (decentralized phase). However, depending on the required capital expenditure, the authority for the final project selection is delegated to a centralized committee (centralized phase). 43 We will consider the interface between the decentralized and the centralized phase of the budgeting process, because this is a crucial point in both the 'board decision' and the 'investment committee proposal' scenario. Note however, the budgeting process should not be thought of as a linear one. Especially, the preparation of the proposals will typically include repeated discussion of preliminary versions, modifications of the project, and re-estimation of cash flows. This may explain empirical evidence indicating that companies consider project definition and cash flow estimation the most difficult steps of the capital budgeting process. 44 Moreover, management accountants discussing the project with applicants have an important pre-decision function. If they qualify proposals as unsatisfactory, these proposals will barely be presented to the investment committee or the board. This is consistent to the very high approval rates observable for those projects finally presented to the decision instances.
45
43 For a formal description cf. Taggart (1987, pp. 179 In this section we will briefly introduce the concept of almost stochastic dominance.
We will demonstrate that it becomes possible by this concept to include the preferences of all relevant decision makers into the analysis. Note that this is a necessary step in modelling capital budgeting processes for organizational settings represented by the 'board decision' or the 'investment committee proposal'. Moreover, we emphasize that ASD allows conveying the decision makers' risk preferences to subordinates responsible for the early and intermediate stages of the capital budgeting process.
We focus on the choice between a risk-free investment in bonds and a real investment alternative with uncertain future cash flows, henceforth referred to as the risky investment project. Let the risky investment project be represented by the sequence of uncertain net cash flows, C t , t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T , where T is the last period of the project's useful life. Assume the initial capital outlay, C 0 ∈ R, to be given and certain, whereas the subsequent periods' net cash flows, C t , are random variables.
The risk-free investment is characterized by the certain initial capital outlay c F 0 and the risk-free interest rate, i ≥ 0. This defines its cash flows in the subsequent periods to be c V . In the following, we will assume a positive expected value of the random NPV, Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the two alternatives' NPVs.
The CDF of the risky investment project's NPV, G(·), is assumed to be continuous on its finite support [v, v] , v < 0 < v. As we will consider its risk explicitly, the NPV is calculated by discounting with the interest rate of the risk-free alternative.
The same procedure applied to the risk-free alternative yields a stepwise CDF, H(·), which assigns probability one to an NPV of zero, see Figure 1 .
Given an organizational setting discussed in section 3, the choice between the to wealth increases. Therefore, the requirement for first order stochastic dominance to hold, i.e., no intersection of the two CDFs, is violated. In Figure 1 , the hatched 46 Cf., e.g., Levy (1992, p. 557) . 47 Cf. Levy (1992, p. 560 ) for a discussion of this aspect.
area indicates the difference between the two CDFs in the region of violation which is restricted to the negative part of the CDF's support. However, recently Leshno/Levy (2002) proposed almost stochastic dominance (ASD), a modified version of stochastic dominance that alleviates this problem.
ASD differs from first order stochastic dominance in the way of handling the violation indicated above. For first order stochastic dominance the existence of such a violation means it is not applicable. In contrast, ASD measures the risky investment project's degree of violation by a parameter ε G . This parameter represents the cumulated difference between the two CDFs in the region of violation (e.g., the size of the hatched area in Figure 1 ) relative to their cumulated difference over the entire support (e.g., the size of the hatched plus the dotted area in Figure 1 ). In a second step, under ASD the set of utility functions is reduced, starting from the set U of all rational and non-satiable utility functions with u (x) > 0 for all x. The process of reducing U is controlled by a second parameter, ε. 48 The set of utility functions remaining after the reduction, U(ε), represents all those decision makers who, despite the violation of first order stochastic dominance, prefer alternative G(·)
to H(·), given the degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement is bounded by ε. Note that U(ε) ⊂ U because some decision makers in U will not tolerate the violation and will thus be eliminated from U. In an application to the capital budgeting procedure, the remaining set U(ε) obviously should contain the set of the relevant decision makers' utility functions as a subset.
Finally, the risky investment, or its CDF G(·), is said to dominate the risk-free investment, or CDF H(·), by ε-almost stochastic dominance (ε-ASD), if and only if
To explain the idea in greater detail, we describe mathematically the degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement and have a closer look at the process of reducing the set of decision makers.
The degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement, ε G
Firstly, in general the size of the hatched area in Figure 1 is given by
while the size of the dotted region may be written as
where V − = − min{V, 0} is the negative part and V + = max{V, 0} is the positive part of the net present value, V . Both of these random variables are almost surely non-negative. Hence, their respective expected values E(V − ) and E(V + ) are nonnegative and given by the areas indicated in Figure 1 .
Following the ideas of Leshno/Levy (2002) , parameter ε G measuring the investment project's degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement is therefore given by
where
is the expected value of random variable |V | conditional on V ≤ 0. Hence, it measures the risk of a potential loss in wealth caused by the risky investment project. Similarly, E(V + ) measures the chance of earning a potential profit. Therefore, (3) can be interpreted as a chance-risk-relationship.
ε-almost stochastic dominance
Secondly, we return to the idea of eliminating from U utility functions u(·), where the magnitude of the reduction is controlled by a predetermined (maximal) degree of violation of first order stochastic dominance, ε. ASD was proposed by Leshno/Levy (2002) for cumulative distribution functions with finite support, [x, x] . Restrict U to twice differentiable functions and the subset U(ε) ⊂ U remaining after the elimination process is given by
For utility functions on R exhibiting risk aversion, i.e., u (x) > 0, u (x) < 0 for all
, the defining inequality in (4) can be reformulated to
Hence, utility functions excluded from U(ε) "... assign a relatively high marginal 49 Cf. Leshno/Levy (2002 , p. 1080 , formula (5). Example: To give a simple example, consider the family of exponential utility functions u e (x) = 1−exp{−rx}, where r > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. If we restrict the analysis to this family, condition (5) reads
For predetermined ε > 0 all decision makers with an exponential utility function remain in U(ε) as long as their degree of absolute risk aversion does not exceed the upper bound, r(ε), determined by (6), i.e., as long as r ≤ r(ε) holds. Hence, for exponential utility functions, the (maximally admissible) degree of absolute risk aversion, r(·), is a function of parameter ε. 52 The derivative of r(·) is
This negative relationship shows that for the family of exponential utility functions an increasing ε implies a decreasing critical risk aversion. Consequently, for a growing (maximal) degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement, ε, decision makers with an ever smaller risk aversion have to be eliminated from U, i.e., the greater ε, the smaller U(ε). 53 Actually, Leshno/Levy (2002 , p. 1079 show that if 
Example: Assume the investment committee consists of seven members, j = 1, ..., 7, with exponential utility functions u j (x) = 1 − exp{−jx}. 55 The committee might in general decide based on the consensus principle or on majority voting.
Suppose the individual voting behaviour exclusively depends on the member's risk assessment of a project. Thus, the appropriate ε * depends on the voting scheme -e.g. unanimity, qualified majority (for instance 75 % or 2 3
), or simple majorityand on the risk preferences of the single decision makers. The pivotal committee member, i.e., the one whose approval ensures the required majority, is indicated by j * . Assume x − x = 0.1. In this simple example the ε * values in Table 4 apply:
Having stated the advantages of almost stochastic dominance, some theoretical considerations shall identify problems to be coped with when implementing ASD in real budgeting procedures:
54 See Appendix B for a formal definition of this value. 55 In this example, all decision makers are risk averse so that an application of Almost Stochastic Second Order Dominance (ASSD) becomes possible, see Leshno/Levy (2002 , p. 1080 (4), and the support of the random NPV's probability distribution [v, v] warrants a discussion, because ε * might vary depending on delegation. To ease the discussion, ε * is replaced by ε * x , given [x, x] is the support used in the definition of U(ε * ) and by ε * v , given [v, v] is the support of the NPV's probability distribution in the following.
The literature indicates that investment competences are delegated to different hierarchy levels depending on project size. For example, Table 5 shows the distribution of critical expenditures requiring formal capital budgeting analysis for the companies included in Fortune 1000.
57
Consider a large project to be authorized by a board level committee, i.e., a situation corresponding to the 'board decision' scenario in section 3. In this case we may assume [x, x] = [v, v] , meaning that the project is accepted or rejected based 56 Cf. Leshno/Levy (2002 , p. 1080 . 57 Cf. Ryan/Ryan (2002, p. 358) . See also Ferreira/Brooks (1988, p. 23) and Arnold (2005, p. 171) . However, note budgeting systems again may vary according to cultural backgrounds, cf., e.g., Bailes/Assada (1991, pp. 133 may be imposed on all small projects to restrict the discretion of lower-level management. Accordingly, a controlled delegation of decision competences, like in the 'investment committee' scenario presented in section 3, becomes possible. However, a small project although rejected by the lower-level decision-makers, might have been authorized by the board, had the board considered it based on its individual interval [v, v] . This is due to the fact
58 As a consequence it may be reasonable to advice the investment committee respectively the representative to submit projects to the top hierarchy level for a final decision, given any doubts remain.
The Leshno-Levy criterion as a tool for the appraisal of risky investment projects
For a thorough analysis of risky investment projects the time structure of cash flows has to be considered. Therefore, let the risky investment project be defined by the sequence of net cash flows, C t , t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T , as defined at the beginning of this section. Assume the initial capital outlay, C 0 ∈ R, to be given and certain, whereas the subsequent periods' net cash flows C t are non-degenerated random variables with probability distribution on the finite interval [c t , c t ]. Moreover, the risk-free investment is characterized by the certain initial capital outlay c F 0 and the risk-free interest rate, i ≥ 0. With this notation, the random NPV, V , of the risky investment 19 is calculated by applying the discount factor, q = 1 + i, to the cash flows
The CDF of random variable V , G(·), lives on the finite support [LB, U B] (see Figure   2 ). The lower bound, LB, of the NPV is given by
while the upper bound is UB = C 0 + q
In the following, we will assume a positive expected value of the random NPV, E(V ) > 0. The reasons for this assumption are that, firstly, the NPV criterion applied to deterministic capital budgeting situations excludes projects with non-positive NPV as disadvantageous.
Secondly, Leshno/Levy (2002, Proposition 2) show that a necessary condition for one alternative dominating the other one in terms of ASD is that the mean of the CDF representing the dominating alternative is strictly larger than the mean of the dominated one. By definition, the mean of the risk-free alternative's NPV is zero.
Therefore, E(V ) > 0, i.e., the classical textbook profitability criterion, is a necessary condition for ASD to hold for a risky investment project. dominates the risk-free investment in the sense of (simple) first order stochastic dominance. However, E(V − ) symbolizes the expected loss in wealth due to choosing the risky instead of the risk-free project. If this expected loss was zero, the probability of a negative NPV, P (V < 0), would vanish, too. To exclude such trivial situations with no economic risk, we assume E(V − ) > 0, and consequently LB < 0. As we have already seen, for this situation first order stochastic dominance 20 does not apply.
The expected value of any random variable may be written as
Consequently, a positive expected NPV, E(V ) > 0, means that the degree of violation of the non-intersection requirement by the risky investment project, i.e., parameter ε G as defined by (3)
60 Moreover, by use of (9) we may replace (3) by
Because of E(V − ) > 0, (10) can be rearranged to the final version of the degree of violation of first order stochastic dominance of the risky investment project
In addition, we choose control parameter ε * so that the utility functions of all relevant decision makers are included in U(ε * ), i.e., D ⊂ U(ε * ). Then the risky project dominates the risk-free one in terms of ASD at level ε * , if and only
In other words, ε * -ASD of the risky project, i.e., G(·) ε * H(·), is equivalent to the following criterion.
Proposition 1 Let the expected NPV, E(V ), and the expected loss in wealth, E(V
be strictly positive. Then
59 Cf. Wolff (1989, p. 19) 60 As is required by Leshno/Levy (2002) . , the restriction on the right hand side is rather weak, whereas it becomes tight for strongly risk-averse decision makers. For ε * → 0, the right hand side of (13) approaches zero. Henceforth, we refer to the inequality in (13) as the Leshno-Levy criterion. It is well known that Ogryczak/Ruszczynski (1999) . By using this expression the Leshno-Levy criterion becomes
Note that we did not assume stochastically independent net cash flows. Typically, one would expect sales volume, prices of materials, or labor etc. and hence corresponding cash flows of subsequent periods to be correlated. Under such circumstances the most advisable approach for evaluating the distribution of the cash flows and, hence, the NPV in practical terms is Monte-Carlo simulation.
Example: Suppose that for a risky investment project the initial capital outlay is 50.000 $ and each of its random cash flows, C t , t = 1, 2, ..., 5, follows a triangular distribution with parameters minimal value, α min , modus, α mod , and maximal value, 61 Recently, the finance literature discussed the Expected Shortfall as a risk measure to replace the criticized Value-at-Risk. Denote again by G(0) = P (V < 0) the probability of a negative NPV V . If both sides of the inequality in (13) are divided by this probability, the left-hand side reads E(V − )/G(0). This is the Expected Shortfall at confidence level G(0), see Acerbi/Tasche (2002) . Thus, the Proposition says that the risky investment project is ε * -ASD, if and only if its 0) . The Expected Shortfall may be rewritten in terms of a mean-risk model with the weighted mean deviation from quantile as the risk measure, see, e.g., Choi/Ruszczynski (2008) . Hence the above interpretation of (13) holds for the mean-risk model as well.
22
The last column of table 6 shows the values for the expected loss resulting from a Monte-Carlo simulation with 10.000 iterations. Here we assume that the correlation of any pair of successive random cash flows, (C t , C t+1 ), t = 1, 2, 3, 4, equals 0.3.
Cash Flow Distribution
Expected NPV and r. h. s. of (13) Table 6 : Parameter values of triangular cash flow distributions, lower bound and mean of NPV, right hand side of (13) 
An interpretation of (13) as a generalization of the payback criterion
While the Leshno-Levy criterion (13) is easily applied in a simulation context, it does not provide much insight into the underlying economic mechanism. Hence, we specify the risky investment in greater detail to gain additional insight. The first assumption enables us to derive a simple and intuitive upper bound for the expected loss, E(V − ), of the risky investment project. 62 The following interpretations of (13) will build upon this upper bound.
Assumption: Convexity of CDF G(·) on [LB, 0]
62 Ogryczak/Ruszczynski (1999) yield an alternative upper bound. They discuss absolute semideviation δ = 0.5
−∞ ∞ |v − E(V )| G(dv) as a measure of risk. From their Corollary 2 follows
Therefore it is easy to derive a mean-risk criterion from the Leshno-Levy criterion (13) which ensures ε * -ASD of the risky project:
Assume that the net present value, V , is a continuous random variable with CDF
G(·). If moreover CDF G(·) is convex on [LB, 0] we get the following upper bound
This upper bound is determined by the probability that the NPV is non-positive, 
is rather flat, but shows a significant probability of very small losses, the upper bound of (15) poorly approximates the true E(V − ).
Assumption: Non-negative cash flows
Condition (15) becomes even simpler, if all future cash flows are non-negative, i.e., c t = 0 for all periods t ≥ 1. This assumption seems to be restrictive only at first glance. 64 Remember that C t is the net cash flow originating from the risky project in period t. Hence, a straightforward interpretation of this assumption is that management anticipating a negative net cash flow in the future will discontinue project operations. Corollary 1 Under assumptions 1. and 2.,
is a sufficient condition for the risky investment project to dominate the risk-free alternative by ε * -ASD, G(·) ε * H(·).
Formula (16) is a generalization of the simple dynamic version of the payback criterion, a fact we will focus on in this section. Further, we will emphasize in section 4.4 that it can be interpreted as a risk-adjusted rate of return as well.
Second, non-negative cash flows allow an interpretation of (13) 
The Figure 3 shows the CDFs of the time-dependent random NPVs To proceed with the payback interpretation of (13) 
is an element of the set of feasible solutions of (13), indicated in figure 4 by the hatched area.
Suppose now that, following the payback procedure,
is not an element of that set of admissible solutions because E(V 0 ) = C 0 < 0. Hence, a period t * , 1 ≤ t * ≤ T exists, when (13) holds for the first time. Combinations calculated for later periods,
leave the set of feasible solutions again. However, for non-negative cash flows C t , t > t * , this is ruled out, because in this case
* reminds of the payback period: All decision makers represented by U (ε * )
prefer the risky investment project to the risk-free investment, if the former's useful life exceeds t * , i.e., t * ≤ T .
For example, the simulation results displayed in table 6 show that E(V − t ), E(V t ) are not elements of the set of admissible solutions for t = 0, 1, ..., 4, while obviously 6.99, 31253.27 ) is. Therefore, t * = 5 can be interpreted as a payback period, if the project's useful life is sufficiently long.
Hitherto, we only assumed non-negativity of cash flows and the convexity of
. If we impose on the risky investment project the additional assumption that expected cash flows are identical, the relationship between the Leshno-Levy criterion (13) and the payback criterion becomes even more obvious. 
Assumption: Random cash flows with identical expected value
Assume in the following a zero interest rate for the risk-free investment, i = 0, as the ordinary static payback criterion does. Further, let expected cash flows be identical, E(C t ) =ĉ > 0, for all periods t ≥ 1. Under these assumptions the expected NPV of the risky project is given by E(V ) = Tĉ − I , and (16) becomes
Inequality (18) and rearranging (18) 
results in
Corollary 2 Under assumptions 1., 2., and 3.
is a sufficient condition for ε * -ASD dominance of the risky investment project,
G(·) ε * H(·).
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In (19) β * is the cut-off value which the project-specific payback period β G should not exceed. If the common static payback period β G is not greater than β * , the risky investment project is the ε * -dominant alternative. Thus, (19) reflects the way the common payback criterion is used as a restriction in capital budgeting processes, see section 3: If the payback period β G is small enough relative to the cut-off value, then the scrutinized risky investment project is acceptable. ε * -almost stochastic dominance as a tool for modeling certain aspects of organizational structures of the company in the way described in this paper, therefore, may conceptually explain the use of the payback criterion in many real-world capital budgeting processes.
Expectedly, the cut-off period β * depends on the risk parameter ε * that represents the decision makers attitude toward risk. Further, it is a function of the project specific useful life T and the probability of eventually suffering a loss,
67 The smaller ε * , i.e., the more risk averse the relevant decision makers are, and the greater the loss probability as a parameter measuring 66 Note that this Corollary is easily modified to cover the alternative scenario used by Levy (1968) in his analysis of the payback criterion. Moreover, we can adjust for the case of non-identical but positive expected cash flows.
67 That the cut-off period should depend on the risk of the project under scrutiny is well known in the literature, cf. Horngreen et al. (2006, p. 731) . the project's inherent risk, the more restrictive is the cut-off value for a given useful life. The longer, c. p., the useful life, the weaker is the requirement given by (19). 
E(V ) > 0 is the expected net present value representing the increase in wealth resulting from the risky investment project. Since the net present value of the risk free investment project is by definition zero, ρ G may be interpreted as a multi-period risk premium, defined for T periods. Hence, the risky investment project dominates the risk-free one in terms of ε * -ASD, if the project's multi-period risk premium exceeds the cut-off valueρ. 69 Phrased differently, the decision makers demand a compensation of at leastρI for the risk they take. While the expected NPV is commonly calculated as
the risky project is dominant by ε * -ASD if according to (20)
68 For example, if the useful life of an investment project is T = 10 years and the probability of a loss in wealth is G(0) = 0.2, the board determining the cut-off payback period to be 3 years implies that ε * = 0.04, i.e., the set of all relevant decision makers, D, is a subset of U(0.04). 69 This cut-off value is transformed into a required markup to the interest rate soon.
This means, the decision makers expect the project to generate (expected and discounted) cash flows which cover not only the initial capital outlay, I, but also the multi-period risk compensation,ρI. Note that the critical value,ρ, and thus the compensation, depend on the project's risk in terms of the probability of a loss in wealth, G(0), and parameter γ(ε * ), representing the risk attitude of the decision makers.
Inequality (20) provides a key to delegating at least part of the investment decision process to lower management levels. Once parameter γ(ε * ) is determined for the investment committee, other managers may collect and analyze projectdata and subsequently calculate the loss probability, the expected net present value E(V ), and the initial capital outlay I. Finally, they can compute the project-specific multi-period risk premium ρ G and compare it to the specific cut-off risk premiumρ derived from (20) . If the cut-off premium is exceeded, the risky investment project is preferable to the risk-free alternative from the investment committee's point of view.
Example: Table 7 depicts the values of parameter ε * computed from (20) for different values of the specific cut-off rateρ and the probability of a loss in wealth G(0). As an example suppose that the relevant decision makers expect a multiperiod risk premium of 0.12 and the probability of suffering a loss in wealth is 0.10. Thus, all decision makers in U(0.227) prefer the risky investment project to the risk-free one. If at least one relevant decision maker was more risk averse, i.e., the corresponding ε * was smaller than 0.227, the risk premium would have to be increased accordingly. Table 7 : ε * for given critical value and loss probability G(0) Table 7 can also be read in another way. From Table 4 we know that in the example of exponential utility functions all seven decision makers are included in U(ε * ) for ε * = 0.332. Thus, if the loss probability is estimated at G(0) = 0.3, a multi-period risk premium above 0.15 is required by the investment committee, given almost stochastic dominance is used as the basis for the final decision.
As stated above the critical risk premium,ρ, is a multi-period rate, i.e., it is not an interest rate for a single period but for the project's whole useful life. In order to emphasize the appropriate interpretation of this multi-period risk premium, it will be transformed into an annual rate. Equating the right hand side of (22) Calculating the risk-adjusted IRR of a project with identical expected cash flows, E(C t ) =ĉ for all t ≥ 1, is particularly simple, as in this case (22) reduces to
Note that we get
from (23), if i * is the common IRR of the investment project calculated from equating (21) to zero, i.e., ignoring the demanded risk compensation, for identical expected cash flowsĉ
Example: For a given cut-off risk-premium ofρ = 0.12, a useful life of T = 6 and a common IRR of i * = 0.15, we derive from (24) α(î, 6) = 1.12α(0.15, 6) = 4, 238620617
or a risk-adjusted IRRî = 0.10934. Hence, this per annum IRR is about 0.04
smaller than the common IRR of i * = 0.15. Put differently, this means that instead of levying a risk compensation ofρI the interest rate of the risk-free investment, i, could be increased by 0.04 to yield the appropriate cut-off value for the common IRR.
denotes the annuity factor for T periods and interest rate i. 71 Note that Pike (1984, p. 344) empirically estimates the risk premium added to the risk-free interest rate between 7% and 16% for typical-risk investment projects. Following the review of a large body of empirical papers in section 2 which emphasize the high relevance of the problem at hand, we develop in section 3 a framework of representative organizational environments of investment decision processes. In contrast to most contributions analyzing the use of key figures in capital budgeting like, e.g., the payback period, we allow for these organizational aspects to play an important role in decision making. On the one hand, we account for the fact that investment responsibility is typically delegated to a group of individuals. Such groups need to agree on the merits of a risky investment project as compared to a risk free investment, demanding descriptions of risk attitudes which can be easily discussed and compared. On the other hand, we take into consideration that preparation of proposals, pre-selection of projects, and decision making are (partly) delegated to lower-level management. Hence, it is a requirement that descriptions of risk attitudes can be easily communicated.
Having derived the importance of the investment decisions' organizational embedding, we introduce in section 4.1 the concept of almost stochastic dominance for describing the risk attitudes of the relevant decision makers. From a theoretical perspective, a risky investment project's profitability is best described by its stochastic net present value. But even if the corresponding distribution function was given and known by all decision makers, the corresponding risk might individually be perceived in different ways due to varying utility functions. This complicates the modeling of capital budgeting decisions in a multi-person context. However, as demonstrated in section 4.2 of this paper, ε-ASD may be extended to represent the risk preferences of a specific group of decision makers characterized by the parameter value ε * . Thus, the participation of a multitude of decision makers is accounted for in a natural way: ε * -ASD of a risky investment project over the risk-free alternative means that all relevant decision makers prefer the first project. We show under very general assumptions that this ε * -ASD is equivalent to a criterion that balances the risky project's expected loss with its expected NPV, weighted by a factor that depends on the decision makers' attitudes toward risk. This criterion is very easily applied to real-world investment projects using simple spread sheet simulation as demonstrated in section 4.2. Note moreover, that determining ε * as the parameter describing the decision makers' risk attitudes might be easier than estimating von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions from a decision analytical point of view.
The simplification of information processing activities inherent to this approach becomes evident, when, an application of the Leshno-Levy criterion or the even simpler payback criterion as stated in Corollary 2 is compared to decision making based on Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in a decentralized firm. Consider a group of decision makers in charge of the capital budgeting decision which wants to delegate preparatory tasks, like, e.g., the pre-selection of viable projects, or the final decision on 'small projects', to the lower ranks of the management hierarchy. Following EUT, the set of individual utility functions representing the relevant decision makers would have to be communicated to those managers responsible for the preparatory stages of the decision making process or selecting 'small' investment projects. In contrast, the use of the ASD payback criterion is fairly simple and secures acceptability from all committee members' point of view. By means of this tool risk preferences are simply conveyed and delegating project selection to lower-level management is easily controlled. Hence, the number of pieces of information to be exchanged is reduced significantly. Instead of communicating a set of utility functions respectively the probability distribution of the NPV only the cut-off value, β * , or the project specific payback period, β G , is transmitted.
The more detailed analysis in section 4.3 shows our criterion to be a generalization of the common payback criterion. Similar considerations apply to the criterion's interpretation as a risk-adjusted internal rate of return in section 4.4. Developing criteria from almost stochastic dominance which coincide with simple key indicators contributes to explaining the payback criterion's prominence. The reason is that these criteria allow to identify the investment alternative preferable by a group of relevant decision makers and simplify communication of risk preferences as well as project characteristics.Since they are derived under fairly general organizational circumstances these criteria are applicable to real-life capital budgeting processes.
Moreover, formulae for calculating cut-off values of these key indicators like in Corollary 2 may support reasonable decision making. Under the corresponding assumptions decisions based on these criteria turn out be rational in terms of decision theory.
Further, these criteria permit identifying investment projects which are commonly acceptable in terms of risk, even at the initial stages of the appraisal process. Thus, they provide reasonable instruments to reduce the burden resting on final decision making bodies with respect to routinely approved projects.
Note that our analysis focuses solely on simple investment appraisals, i.e., the choice between a risky investment project and a risk-free alternative. This is no limitation for the majority of 'small investment projects' involving decision-delegation to lower and middle management. Here, restrictions on liquidity are of minor interest, meaning the projects will be assessed based exclusively on their individual merits. Considerations will be different for 'large investment projects' challenging a company's financial resources. Here, with two or more projects competing for liquidity, the choice will be between different risky investment projects. In this case, the role of the payback criterion may be that of a necessary condition, meaning the criterion has to be met by the project for being considered as a reasonable alternative. Moreover, for projects of this importance a formal investment proposal should be required. Here, the payback criterion may serve as one important indicator, but the final decision will depend on a number of additional aspects, like strategic, managerial, technological or others.
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A Additional evidence on PB's prominence
Recent data from a European survey study are presented in 
B Facts and definitions
For reading convenience we put together the following definition and facts (D1) For y, y ∈ R, y < y, the set U(ε; y) of twice differentiable, non-satiable, and real valued utility functions is defined by Proof: Let [ε n , n ∈ N], 0 < ε n < 1/2, be a sequence of numbers with lim n→∞ ε n = 0. Due to (F2) [U(ε n ; y), n ∈ N] is a non-decreasing sequence of sets. Now let e = min{e u : u ∈ D} be the smallest of the bounds defined in (F3) for any utility function in the set D. 0 <ê < 1/2 holds true because there is at least one nonlinear utility function in D. Hence, there is an nê ∈ N so that for all n ≥ nê we have ε n <ê. For all these ε n , due to (F3), D ⊆ U(ε n ; y) . Thus from definition (27) follows that E(D; y) is non-empty. Moreover, E(D; y) is bounded by 0 andê < 1/2. 
With this definition we get the following result for intervals [v < v] 
